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COMMENTARY
THE CONNECTICUT LAW REVISION
COMMISSION REPORT ON
PREJUDGMENT DISCLOSURE AND
THE ABOLITION OF BODY
ATTACHMENT AND BODY EXECUTION
MICHAEL

R.

PARIZO*

In 1980, the Connecticut Law Revision Commission (the Com
mission), I recommended the enactment of a disclosure in aid of pre
judgment remedy device and the abolition of two antediluvian
creditor remedies: Body execution and body attachment. 2 These
proposals became law when the 1981 General Assembly passed, and
the Governor signed, Public Act 81-410. 3
I.

ABOLITION OF BODY EXECUTION

Body execution permitted judgment creditors, in actions for
fraud,4 breach of fiduciary duty,S and tort,6 to imprison their judg
ment debtors until the judgment was paid. The remedy had been
• Member of the Connecticut Bar; Staff Attorney, Connecticut Law Revision
Commission; B.A., Connecticut College, 1976; J.D. Temple University School of Law,
1979.
1. The Connecticut Law Revision Commission is a legislative agency charged with
the statutory duty to "[r]ecommend, from time to time, such changes in the law as it
deems necessary to modify or eliminate antiquated and inequitable rules of law, and to
bring the law of this state, civil and criminal, into harmony with modem condi
tions. . . ." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2-87 (1981).
2. For the full text of the recommendation see CONN. LAW REVISION COMM'N,
SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CONNECTICUT LAW REVISION COMMISSION TO THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, app. C, at 2-39 (1980) [hereinafter cited as SIXTH ANNUAL
REPORT].
3. 1981 Conn. Pub. Acts.
4. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-562 (1981).
5. ld. § 52-355.
6. Campbell v. Klahr, III Conn. 225, 149 A. 770 (1930) (authorizing body execu
tion in tort actions).
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used to punish recalcitrant debtors, thereby compelling them to dis
close their assets.7 Criminal sanctions, however, are available to
punish those guilty of fraud and other torts, 8 and disclosure of assets
can be compelled under the examination of judgment debtor proce
dure.9 Consequently, the Commission concluded that body execu
tion no longer was necessaryJO and recommended its abolition.
II.

ABOLITION OF BODY ATTACHMENT

The Commission also had a number of reasons for recom
mending the abolition of body attachment. Body attachment could
be used by plaintiffs, in actions for fraud II and breach of fiduciary
duty, 12 to imprison their debtors until sufficient assets were produced
for attachment. 13 The remedy was subject to attack on constitutional
grounds. Section 52-369, which authorized body execution, was
challenged in Abbit v. Bernier l4 as a denial of equal protection in
violation of the fourteenth amendment. Defendant debtor argued
that section 52-369 was unconstitutional because the issue of his abil
ity to pay the debt was not heard prior to levy of the execution. IS
Consequently, a person could be imprisoned solely because of indi
gency.16 The United States District Court for the District of Con
necticut ruled, inter alia, that debtors had to be· given notice and an
opportunity to be heard on their ability to pay a judgment debt prior
to levy of a body execution. 17 Body attachment was susceptible to
7. See 33, C.l.S. Executions § 407, at 763 (1942).
8. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-119 (1981).
9. Id. § 52-397.
10. The Commission also argued that the remedy was archaic and rarely used,
ineffective and costly, subject to abuse, unsound in principle, and constitutionally sus
pect. See Abbit v. Bernier, 387 F. Supp. 57 (D. Conn. 1974). These issues are discussed
more extensively in SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, note 2 supra at 7-14.
II. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-562 (1981).
12. Id. Section 52-279 authorizes body attachment in actions where body execution
is authorized. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-355 authorizes body execution in actions for
breach of fiduciary duty. Consequently, body attachment is authorized for breach of
fiduciary duty.
13. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-279 (1981) (body attachment is not authorized in tort
actions).
14. 387 F. Supp. 57, 59 (D. Conn. 1974).
15. Id. at 60.
16. Id. at 61 (quoting Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971».
17. Id. at 62; q. Palumbo v. Manson, 35 Conn. Supp. 130,400 A.2d 288 (Super.
Ct. 1979). In Po/umbo, the court held that CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-369 (1981) was not
facially unconstitutional as hearings normally are held prior to levy of a body execution.
Id. It is not without some irony that the court conceded that a meaningful hearing had
not been held in the case before it and; consequently, conducted one. Id. at 135, 400
A.2d at 291.
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the same challenge because notice and a hearing on the issue of indi
gency were not statutorily required prior to levy of the body
attachment.
Body attachment also was ineffective and costly. One commen
tator found body attachment "practically valueless" as a method of
collecting debts and argued that the "experience of practicing attor
neys will bear out the assertion that there are not five instances in a
hundred in which the order of arrest results in the collection of a
debt from a party who could not be otherwise compelled to pay."IS
One reason body attachment was ineffective was its negligible value
as a punishment device. Indeed, the value of body attachment as
punishment has been described as "almost farcical."19 Charles Ev
ans Hughes, before he became Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, explained that, while the "rascal who has been
guilty of embezzlement or fraudulent practices may stand in fear of
the criminal law, ... the law of civil arrest, gives him little anxi
ety."20 Hughes concluded that body attachment effected "a punish
ment ... too mild to be a terror to evil doers. . . ."21 Body
attachment also was ineffective because of the costs involved. The
creditor had to pay the costs of maintaining an incarcerated debtor.22
While these costs could be added to the defendant's debt,23 there was
no guarantee that the creditor would prevail in his action and even
less assurance that the creditor could compel the debtor to pay a sum
larger than the one for which he was unwilling to give security in the
first instance. 24
III.

DISCLOSURE IN

AID

OF PREJUDGMENT REMEDY

Following its decision that body attachment was not a viable
method for coercing the disclosure of hidden assets, the Commission
next considered whether any coercive prejudgment disclosure device
18. Note, Arrests in Civil Actions, 5 ALBANY L.J. 243, 244 (1872). See also, Ford,
Imprisonment for Debt, 25 MICH. L. REV. 24, 47-48 (1926); Sterling, Siudy Relaling 10
Civil Arresl in California, reprinled in CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, RECOMMENDATION
AND STUDY RELATING TO CIVIL ARREST, 27, 29-30 (July, 1972); Note, Arresl and Impris
onment in Civil Actions in New York, 26 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 172, 181, n.72 (1951).
19. Hughes, Arrest and Imprisonment on Civil Process, 28 REP. N.Y. ST. B.A. 151,
173 (1905).

20. Id. at 173.
Id. at 174.

21.

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-59 (1981).
Id. § 18-60.
24. See, e.g., 2 E. STEPHENSON, CONNECTICUT CIVIL PROCEDURE § 217, at 929 (2d
22.
23.

ed. 1970).
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should be made available to creditors simply on allegations of debt
or damages. Simply abolishing body attachment was one alterna
tive. California took this approach when it abolished body attach
ment, forbade imprisonment on civil process prior to judgment,25
and refused to extend other creditor disclosure devices. 26 Although
less court time is spent hearing attachment matters under the Cali
fornia procedure and a defendant is free of any coercion until a
judgment has been rendered against him, the plaintiff is unable to
secure his claim unless he knows the location of the defendant's
assets.27
In contrast to California, New York enacted a broad disclosure
remedy when it abolished body attachment. 28 Under New York
procedure, a plaintiff can file a motion for an order directing a de
fendant to disclose information regarding property in which he has
an interest. 29 If the defendant refuses to answer a proper question,
the plaintiff can apply to the court for an order to compel disclo
sure. 30 If the defendant remains contumacious, the court can impose
sanctions. 31
The Commission recommended that Connecticut adopt a dis
closure in aid of prejudgment remedy device similar to the New
York procedure. 32 The Commission believed that disclosure was a
necessary supplement to the remedy of attachment. 33 This principle
already was embodied in Connecticut law authorizing body attach
ment, body execution, examination ofjudgment debtors, and discov
ery against garnishees. 34 One flaw of body attachment was its
ineffectiveness. Creditors, by virtue of the prejudgment remedies
act, were given the right to attach the property of their debtors if they
CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 501 (Deering Supp. 1982).
26. See id. § 491.010 Law Revision Commission comment, (Deering Supp. 1982).
27. Id. §§ 481.010-493.010 (1982).
28. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW §§ 6001-7000 (publisher's explanation) (McKinney
1980).
29. Id. § 6220.
30. See id. § 6220 (practice commentary).
31. Id. § 3126 (McKinney Supp. 1980). These sanctions include "such orders with
regard to the failure or refusal as are just, among them: . . . 3. an order . . . rendering
judgment by default against the disobedient party." Id.
32. Under New York law, an order of attachment and consequent disclosure are
available in a limited number of cases including fraud. Id. § 6201 (McKinney 1980). q:
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-278a to 279 (1981) (permitting attachment in any case in which
plaintiff can show probable cause for the validity of his claim). Consequently, disclosure
will be available in a greater number of cases in Connecticut than in New York.
33. SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, note 2 supra, app. C, at 15.
34. See notes 2, 4-6, 9, and 11-13 supra and accompanying text.
25.
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could show probable cause for the validity of their claims.35 The
exercise of that right, however, was subject to the defendant's ability
to hide assets and limited by the plaintiff's ability to discover them.
Attachment is an empty remedy when the creditor is without knowl
edge of any readily accessible assets. The problem, therefore, was to
devise a remedy that could be used effectively by creditors and, at
the same time, would protect debtors from abuse.
The legislature adopted the following language:
(a) The court may, on motion of a party, order an appearing
defendant to disclose property in which he has an interest or debt
owing to him sufficient to satisfy a prejudgment remedy. The
existence, location and extent of the defendant's interest in such
property or debts shall be subject to disclosure. The form and
terms of the disclosure shall be determined by the court.
(b) A motion to disclose pursuant to this section may be
made by attaching it to the application for a prejudgment remedy
or may be made at any time after the filing of the application.
(c) The court may order disclosure at any time prior to final
judgment after it has determined that the party filing the motion
for disclosure has, pursuant to either section 52-278d, 52-278e or
52-278i of the general statutes, probable cause sufficient for the
issuance of a prejudgment remedy.
(d) A defendant, in lieu of disclosing assets pursuant to sub
section (a) of this section, may move the court for substitution
either of a bond with surety substantially in compliance with sec
tions 52-307 and 52-308 of the general statutes or of other suffi
cient security.
(e) Rules of court shall be enacted to carry out the foregoing
provisions and may provide for reasonable sanctions to enforce
orders issued pursuant to this section. 36
Use of the procedure is relatively straightforward. The plaintiff
first must file a motion for disclosure. 3? The court hearing the mo
tion then must find probable cause sufficient for the issuance of a
prejudgment remedy (PIR), after which disclosure can be ordered
against an appearing defendant. 38 The motion procedure was writ
ten to be as convenient as possible for courts and creditors. Subsec
tion (b) provides that the plaintiff's motion may be "made by
attaching it to the application for a prejudgment remedy or may be
35. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-278d, 52-278e & 52-278i (1981).
36. 1981 Conn. Pub. Acts 81-410.
37. Id. at 81-41O(b).
-,
38. Id. at BI-41O(c).
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made at any time after the filing of the application."39 Plaintiffs are
given the opportunity to make their motion for disclosure at the
same time that they apply for a PJR because both the order of at
tachment and the order of disclosure require the same finding of
probable cause. 40 Because a party may file his motion for disclosure
at the same time he files his application for a PJR,41 the court can
make a contemporaneous finding of probable cause as to the PJR
and the motion to disclose. If probable cause is found and disclosure
is ordered, the defendant either may make the ordered disclosure or
may move the court for substitution of a bond or other sufficient
security.42 Defendants who refuse to disclose are subject to court
ordered sanctions. 43
Unlike body attachment, the new disclosure device is available
in all cases in which attachment is warranted. 44 Because body at
tachment could be used to punish, it had been limited to cases in
which the defendant, in some manner, was culpable: Fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty are examples. Discovery, however, is a col
lection device only:45 It should be available to creditors regardless of
the honesty or dishonesty of their debtors. Further, the scope of dis
covery is broad. The defendant can be required to disclose the exist
ence, location, and extent of his interest in property, factors crucial
to any meaningful disclosure.
The statute also is intended to protect defendants from abuse.
Discovery is permitted only against appearing defendants;46 thus it
protects unsophisticated debtors who fail to appear and insolvent
debtors who plan to default from creditor threats of imprisonment
for contempt.
Appearing defendants also are protected from frivolous and
harassing orders of disclosure. In the first instance, defendants are
39. fd. at 81-41O(b).
40. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-278d, 52-278e & 52-278i (1981) set forth the probable
cause necessary for the issuance of an order of attachment. These sections are incorpo
rated by reference in subsection (c) of the new section. 1981 Conn. Pub. Acts 81~41O(c).
41. fd. at 81-41O(b).
42. fd. 81-41O(d).
43. /d. 81-41O(e).
44. The writ of body attachment, at one time, was available in all actions for debt
and damages. Creditor abuse, however, led to the prohibition of its use in actions
founded on contract.
45. It can be argued that the new procedure can be used as a punishment device as
court ordered sanctions are available against defendants refusing to disclose. The argu
ment is specious as the punishment is levied, not because of the defendant's inability to
pay a debt, but because of his refusal to obey an order of the court.
46. 1981 Conn. Pub. Acts 8l-41O(a).
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protected because of the costs involved. They also are protected by
the contingent finding of "probable cause sufficient for the issuance
of a prejudgment remedy."47 This requirement also ensures that de
fendants always will be presented with an opportunity to contest
probable cause. Additional protection from unnecessary requests for
disclosure is offered defendants by provisions in the new section pro
viding for judicial discretion. Subsection (a) ensures that even if a
finding of probable cause is made, the order of disclosure still will be
within the discretion of the court.48 The form and contents of disclo
sure also are matters of judicial discretion. 49 Finally, the defendant
can be required to disclose only assets sufficient to satisfy the order
of attachment. 50
A defendant can avoid disclosure, even after it has been or
dered, by substituting sufficient security. In ordinary attachment
cases, the defendant cannot substitute a bond until an attachment
has been levied. 51 As a result, the defendant's interest in his property
may be disrupted. Under the new procedure, a defendant who has
been ordered to disclose may substitute a bond or other sufficient
security prior to the attachment being levied, thereby avoiding a dis
turbance of his interest.5 2 This procedure also benefits creditors be
cause it allows them to become secured earlier.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Public Act 81-410 not only abrogates two archaic remedies from
Connecticut practice but also closes a gap in the current attachment
procedure by establishing a disclosure in aid of prejudgment remedy
device that allows plaintiffs to obtain information regarding attacha
ble assets from appearing defendants.

47 . .1d. at 81-4IO(c).
48. Id. at 81-4IO(a).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.·
. 52. 19~1 Conn. Pub. Acts 81-4IO(d).

